The relationship between medical clinicians and patients is described as potentially tragic in nature and a context in which courage can be a relevant virtue. Danger, risk, uncertainty, and choice are presented as features of clinical relationships that also function as necessary conditions for courage. The clinician is seen as a ‘sustaining presence’ who has duties of ‘encouragement’ with respect to patients. The patient is seen to have a duty to learn the condition of human existence which can be discovered (...) in clinical relations and to develop the virtues necessary to a fitting negotiation of human life. Case examples of courage on the parts of the principal participants in the clinical encounter are provided. In addition, several goods for clinicians and patients as objects of courage are identified. Keywords: virtue, courage, tragedy, clinical medicine CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Theology and Bioethics. Earl E. Shelp, editor.

Paul's concept of the “body,” so obscure for our modern way of thinking, nevertheless underlies the whole of his theology, and is decisive for understanding Paul's teaching on ethics, sacraments, ministry, and the Christian hope.

E j lemmon, B a o williams, Bas van fraassen, And ruth marcus have argued on behalf of the existence of moral dilemmas, I.E., Cases where an agent is subject to conflicting absolute moral obligations. The paper criticizes this support and contends that no moral dilemma is possible.

An examination of late Rorty shows that he does not abandon belief in an external world about which we can, and indeed must, acquire knowledge. His disapproval of the correspondence theory of truth does not involve the idea that anything other than local weather, for example, could falsify remarks about local weather. It is just that once we get done looking out the window or, if we are outside, feeling the right kind of drops make contact with our skin, there (...) is nothing else we can do, nothing better, to make ourselves more certain, more cognitively secure. One can see this in the detailed work that enables scientific progress. Science improves itself by doing more of the same. G. E. Moore's famous open question stays open only as a reminder that our fallibility never disappears and that our cognitive security is never better than pro tem. Rorty, as a faithful pragmatist and undogmatic meliorist, thinks this is perfectly O.K. (shrink)

A state's foreign policy is constrained by parameters that inhere in the structure of the international system and in the nation's own political‐constitutional, social, and economic systems. The latter, domestic parameters, include “public opinion.” Because the public is largely ignorant of foreign affairs, policy‐making elites have wide scope for acting more rationally than would otherwise be possible, although public opinion operates on the second‐order effects of foreign policy (e.g., taxes, casualties)—inviting mismatches of objectives and means. The prevalent nonrational theories of (...) foreign‐policy derivation are themselves largely ignorant of the dominantly rational processes of the state, particularly in its foreign and military functions. (shrink)

Notes on stratification, education, and mobility in industrial societies, by E. Hopper.--Social selection in the welfare state, by T. H. Marshall.--Domination and assertion in educational systems, by M. Scotford-Archer and M. Vaughan.--Sponsored and contest mobility and the school system, by R. H. Turner.--A typology for the classification of educational systems, by E. Hopper.--The management of knowledge: a critique of the use of typologies in educational sociology, by I. Davies.--Selection and knowledge management in education systems, by D. Smith.--Systems of education and (...) systems of thought, by P. Bourdieu.--On the classification and framing of educational knowledge, by B. Bernstein.--The political functions of the educational system, by H. Zeigler.--Power, ideology, and the transmission of knowledge: an exploratory essay, by D. Smith.--Theoretical advance and empirical challenge, by A. H. Halsey.--A cross-cultural outline of education, by J. Henry.--Educational systems and selected consequences of patterns of mobility and non-mobility in industrial societies: a theoretical discussion, by E. Hopper. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, for Nietzsche, the will to power is a kind of élan vital, i.e., vital impulse, force or drive. In living creatures, it is a drive to express their natures. In human beings, it is complex and must be developed in stages. The initial stages include becoming independent and striving for freedom of spirit and expression. Of the few that achieve the last stage, some will become the Übermensch or superior persons who will achieve great (...) creative acts and in so doing enhance the capabilities of all humans. Nietzsche spoke as if he were one of the free spirits, but implicit in his writings is the idea that he is an exemplar of the Übermensch. (shrink)

The essay argues that some factual propositions are both clearly true and not known. The essays argues that those propositions are evidence for anyone to whom they are clearly true.

The Search for the Legacy of the USPHS Syphilis Study at Tuskegee is a collection of essays from experts in a variety of fields seeking to redefine the legacy of the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study. The essayists place the legacy of the study within the evolution of racial and ethnic relations in the United States. Contributors include two leading historians on the study, two former United States Surgeons General, and other prominent scholars from a wide range of fields.

Moral judgment and behavior are uniquely resistant to psychological analysis because morality generally is defined in terms that do not admit of psychological predication. Principal among these is the idea of freedom. An agent can act morally only on the condition that it is also free to do otherwise. The respective theoretical premises of C. Sunstein and E. Brunswik are contrasted in order to suggest that Brunswikian theory constitutes a distinct and highly promising new approach to the psychology of moral (...) judgment. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Bryan Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter treats several immensely important and understudied topics—public ignorance of economics, political ideology, and their connection to policy error—from an orthodox economic perspective whose applicability to these topics is overwhelmingly disproven by the available evidence. Moreover, Caplan adds to the traditional and largely irrelevant orthodox economic notion of rational public ignorance the claim that when voters favor counterproductive economic policies, they do so deliberately, i.e., knowingly. This leads him to assume (without any evidence) (...) that “emotion or ideology” explain mass economic error. Straightforward, unchosen mass ignorance of economic principles—neither “rational” nor “irrational,” but simply mistaken—is a more coherent explanation for economic error, and it is backed up by the vast body of public‐opinion research. (shrink)

O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemológicas de uma forma que (...) é ótima para que se perceba o núcleo dos problemas. Oferece soluções, sem mascarar as dificuldades. Nós fornecemos ilustração disso através da consideração dos problemas da justificação a priori e do ceticismo. O evidencialismo também oferece a base para que se compreenda uma grande variedade de fatos e conceitos epistemológicos. Nós fornecemos ilustração disso, mostrando que o evidencialismo pode explicar como a justificação pode ser anulada, como as atitudes distintas da crença podem ser objeto de avaliação e como a própria prática da filosofia é epistemicamente valiosa. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Evidencialismo. Evidência. Justificação. Conhecimento. A priori. Ceticismo. ABSTRACT Evidentialism is primarily a thesis about epistemic justification and secondarily a thesis about knowledge. It holds that epistemic justification supervenes on evidence. Versions of evidentialism differ about what counts as evidence, what it is to have something as evidence, and what a particular body of evidence supports. The secondary thesis is that evidential support is necessary for knowledge. Evidentialism helps to frame epistemological issues in a way that is optimal for seeing the heart of the problems. It offers solutions without disguising the difficulties. We illustrate this by considering the problems of a priori justification and skepticism. Evidentialism also provides the basis for understanding a variety of epistemological facts and concepts. We illustrate this by showing that evidentialism can explain how justification can be defeated, how attitudes other than belief can be the object of evaluation, and how the practice of philosophy itself is epistemically valuable. KEY WORDS – Evidentialism. Evidence. Justification. Knowledge. A priori. Skepticism. (shrink)

Charles Rosenberg’s latest book is a collection of ten essays spanning twelve years’ work on the history of American medicine, and seeks to provide both the historian and the practicing physician with an understanding of the framework that lies beneath our modern medical system. He states his cause explicitly in the opening chapter: “Insofar as I have a personal agenda, it is a desire to underline the need...for physicians to think and act on an understanding of [their] unique social and (...) moral identity. It means thinking critically about...the world that informs and constrains clinical choices” (p. 11). (shrink)